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Abstract:  
 
 
This article deals with the motivations of Public to Private Transactions in Europe, USA and 
Asia from 2000 to 2007. We determine seven main motivations (Tax savings, Incentive 
realignment, Control, Free Cash Flow, Growth of Prospects, Takeover Defence and 
Undervaluation). Then, we study which are the motivations of a firm to go private. For this, 
we first do a univariate study and then we realize a multivariate analysis in order to interplay 
all the motivations. At the end we determine the profile of all Public to Private for each area 
geographical. In general, firms which have low perspective of growth, low liquidity, 
important Free Cash Flow are the three main motivations for a Public to Private. Then we 
have some specialities for each zone: in Europe (importance of a Family blockholder), in Asia 
(importance of the level of taxation).  
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1. Introduction 
 
The companies have two primary ways that allow them to finance : on the one hand by the 
auto-financing and the other hand using a public offering or making a leverage (LBO for 
example). This last technique of external financing is done through their listing. The stock 
market allows them to find another way to finance them through various techniques such as 
fundraising, public call for savings.  
 
According to the Financial Markets Authority, in 2006, IPOs accounted for 500 billion dollars 
in terms of funds raised while firms which go private (PtoP) represented 250 billion dollars. 
Why do we attend to such proportion of delisting? That is the question we address in the 
study. In general, why do we attend to delistings? Several reasons can be mentioned:  
 
 Exchange gives no longer sufficient liquidity to shareholders. 
 The bond rating is very theorical because investors are disinterested. 
 The company may no longer need the scholarship to increase awareness of its 
products.  
 Company can have a good notoriety so it doesn’t need to be in quotation. 
 The companies have made a miscalculation and realize that their IPO would not have 
occurred.  
 The interests of shareholders and managers may diverge (Jensen, 1989). 
 The company incurred costs related to listing too high relative to its turnover.  
 An unfavourable economic environment does not allow them to find the financing 
sought.  
 
These several reasons can explain the growing trend of companies which decide to go private. 
They are grouped under the term of Public to Private transactions. Globally, the country 
which has experienced for the first time this phenomenon is the United States in the early 80s. 
The popularity of these operations has been as Jensen (1989) predicted the end of the listed 
companies for not giving way to companies out of the exchange. This rapid development is 
explained by the fact that many groups wanted to part with some of their subsidiaries. Europe 
and especially United Kingdom, pioneer of this phenomenon for the continent has experiences 
such operations in the mid 80s. It was the second country worldwide to know its first Public 
to Private transactions. The two pioneer countries of operations of Public to Private (U.S. and 
U.K.) have experienced increasing continuously during the 80s until the outbreak of various 
financial scandals in which their development was significant reduced. It is at the end of the 
90s, in 1997, their revival is notable. Since, they are increasing.  
 
The introduction if this type of operation applies to all European countries and especially for 
France. Indeed, the development of Public to Private transactions in France was much later 
than in the Anglo-Saxon: it is in the late of 90s when the first transaction appeared. As we 
noted earlier, the economic downturn may affect the development of these operations: the 
listed companies do not find enough cash, investors are not interested in companies less 
profitable, they are obliged to go private to avoid a default. Therefore, the various economic 
crises faced by these companies such as the housing crisis in 2007 can have a significant 
impact on their development. This observation is verified by Euronext Paris, which accounts 
for an increasing number of delisted since the stock market bubble. Similarly, small caps with 
low volume of activity on the stock market face many difficulties in the finance market to 
obtain some financial resources. In addition, costs of listing on the stock market that supports 
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small companies are disproportionated to their low capitalization, making their financial 
structure even more fragile.  
Asia is the last continent to discover this phenomenon. Only, in the 2000s and especially in 
the mid-2000s where the first operations have emerged. This explains the absence of 
empirical studies on this subject.  
 
Along with this increase in Public to Private transactions, empirical researches have 
developed particularly in the two founding countries (the United States and United Kingdom). 
The authors were interested firstly to determine the factors responsible for delisted stock 
market and secondly to study and evaluate the impact of Public to Private transactions to the 
shareholders wealth. The main motivations tested and whose significance has been confirmed 
are the following: Public to Private transactions are undervalued relative to the market 
average (Weir, Laing, Wright, 2005a) which forces them to leave the stock market. The fact 
that they go private, firms benefit tax savings (Kosedag and Lane, 2002), they can also 
resolve the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers (Weir, Laing, Wright, 
2005b). Indeed, these two actors have different objectives, their strategies differ which leads 
mismanagement in the firm. After leaving the stock market, they gain a more concentrated 
control and efficient which allows them to align the interests of both shareholders and 
managers (Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg, 1999).  
 
As we have often pointed out, empirical studies are mostly American or English and they are 
conducted at a national level that is the reason why our work is distinguished by the following 
reasons:  
 
First, the study is international, the sample includes the Public to Private transactions in the 
United States, Europe and Asia.  
Second, the Asia continent is first for the first time incorporated into a study. 
And third, the review period is recent: from 2000 to 2007. 
 
All these reasons, this study may help bring some new elements to the literature on the Public 
to Private transactions. As emphasized Renneboog and Simons (2008), the literature about 
Public to Private transactions suffers from a lack of studies on other countries that the United 
States and United Kingdom.  
 
Following this analysis, the problematic of this research is the following: which are the 
motivations of Public to Private transactions (it corresponds to one part of the global 
processus of Public to Private transactions). 
 
To study it, a rigorous methodology has been conducted throughout our study.  
 
In a first time, we outline the hypotheses that we will identify the main motivations of Public 
to Private transactions. The theorical and empirical literature provide several possible answers 
(Renneboog, Simons, 2005; Renneboog, Simons, Wright, 2006). For our study we focused on 
seven factors explaining the delisting of companies which are:  
 
1. Tax saving 
2. Incentive Realignment 
3. Control  
4. Free Cash Flow 
5. Growth Prospects 
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6. Protective Anti-Takeover 
7. Undervaluation 
 
In a second time, we have to determine the motivations of Public to Private tranasactions, two 
methods were used:  
 
On the one hand, a univariate analysis was performed to calculate the mean difference 
between the variables used for each hypothesis.  
 
On the other hand a binary logistic regression was performed allowing to take all the variables 
that are used to study the seven hypotheses interact with each other.  
 
Being jointly pursue these studies provides a more accurate and confirmation of the results of 
the univariate analysis as was the case for studying Achleitner, Hintenamskogler and Betzer 
(2008). Note that to achieve a binary logistic regression, we form a control sample using the 
technique of pairing.  
 
The results can provide a profile of Public to Private transactions from geographical areas: 
 
Europe:  
 
 Low Managers share  
 Important Family Blockholder  
 Low importance of Corporation blockholder. 
 Low growth prospects  
 Low liquidity 
 
United Kingdom :  
 Low Managers share  
 Low importance of Family Blockholder 
 Importance of Free Cash Flow. 
 Low Q ratio. 
 Low Liquidity 
 
USA : 
 Low importance of Family Blockholder 
 Importance of Free Cash Flow  
 Low Q ratio. 
 Low Liquidity 
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Asia :  
 Important level of Taxation: a charasteristic of Asia  
 Low Gearing 
 Low importance of Institutional Blockholder 
 Importance of Free Cash Flow. 
 Low Q ratio. 
 Low Liquidity 
 
The purpose of this article is twofold: 
 
  
 To highlight the typical profile of a company from Public to Private. 
 To consider the most relevant variables. 
 
This paper is organised as: Section 1 is the introduction, section 2 is the literature review 
which presents the main motivations of Public to Private transaction, section 3 deals with the 
methodology, section 4 presents the descriptive data and section 5 presents the results and we 
make a conclusion in section 6.  
 
 
8. Literature review: Motivations of a Public to Private Transaction 
 
Occurring in the context of PtoP transaction and the economic theories, companies withdrew 
from the stock quote can be explained by many motivations (Renneboog, Simons, 2005).  
 
We illustrate in the following paragraphs the explanation of each reason cited above. At the 
end of each of them we deduce a hypothesis that emerged from each study that’s why the 
assumptions derived from the comments below will be represented by a box. 
  
A. Tax Saving 
 
Most operations of Public to Private is realized by making borrowing relatively large so by an 
increase of leverage. Interest deductible is an important source of wealth (Lowenstein, 1985). 
However, this deduction depends on the tax system in which the operation is realised. Interest 
deductibility of these new loans created a large tax shield increasing the value of the company 
before the transaction. For the period from 1980 to 1986, Kaplan (1989b) estimates that the 
tax saving of PtoP in the United States is estimated between 21 and 72% of premiums paid to 
shareholders to take a company that withdraws from the listing market. Two variables 
measure the tax saving: taxation (the level of taxation) and gearing (financial debt/shareholder 
funds).  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
 
Firms which benefit tax saving are more likely to go private.  
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B. Incentive realignment 
 
 
The views from Adam Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932) on the divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders are formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In this 
model, when a manager assigns a portion of its receivables to outside investors, the marginal 
costs of pecuniary benefits reduce only a fraction. Finally, manager increases his private 
interests which lower the value of the firm at the expense principal. The private equity firms 
have many mechanisms for reward good managers for their good performance when they 
engage in a Public to Private transaction (Fenn et al., 1995). Private Equity firms (the 
principal) try to realign the interests of managers (agents) with them. The hypothesis of 
realignment of interest says that the wealth of shareholders of a PtoP is largely the result of a 
system to meet the interests of the agent and principal. However the effects of the realignment 
hypothesis of interest at a high level of managerial participation are contested because of  the 
entrenchment effect (Morck, Schleifer, Visny, 1998; McConnel and Servaes, 1990) that may 
prevent or delay restructuring leaders and also the restructuring of the company (Franks, 
Mayer, Renneboog, 2001). 
We use a dummy variable (managerial ownership) which is equal to 1 if the managers hold 
more 25% of share of the company.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
 
Firms where there is a conflict interests between shareholders and managers are more likely to 
go private.  
 
 
C. Control 
 
Easterbrook, Fischel (1983), Grossman, Hart (1988) explain why shareholders in individual 
companies with dispersed ownership can underinvest in monitoring (the problem of free-
rider). After an LBO, the property of the company is much more concentrated by giving 
stronger incentives for investors (the principal) and more information to invest in monitoring 
management (Maug, 1998; Admati, Pleider, Zechner, 1994). Furthermore, in judging the 
viability and success of acquisitions famous, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) argue that 
investors may have a comparative advantage in the monitoring task (Fenn et al., 1995). By 
this, it means that the Public to Private transaction can create value by solving the problem of 
free-rider on the control of managers (the agent). The hypothesis of control argues that the 
wealth obtained by shareholders depends largely on the outcome of the supervision system 
imposed by the management team in place. Although the literature on agency costs provides 
three sources for the wealth of Public to Private transaction, this practice is difficult to make. 
Lowenstein (1985) explained with the theory of the stick and the carrot: carrot represents the 
increase shares that managers hold allowing them to enjoy more benefits. The stick is when 
companies use a massive debt forcing them to reduce benefits that previously were bunched 
managers in order to manage the company effectively avoiding bankruptcy (Paste, Peck, 
2001).  
 
Control is divided into three parts:  
 
Institutional Blockholder: this variable is equal to 1 when this blockholder has at least 5% of 
share of capital otherwise it is 0. 
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Corporation Blockholder: this variable is equal to 1 when this blockholder has at least 5% of 
share of capital otherwise it is 0. 
Family Blockholder: this variable is equal to 1 when this blockholder has at least 5% of share 
of capital otherwise it is 0.  
  
Hypothesis 3:  
 
Firms where capital is dispersed are more likely to go private.  
 
 
D. Free Cash Flow 
 
Jensen (1986) defines Free Cash Flow as “cash flow in surplus from which is required to fund 
all projects that have a positive net present value”. In using empirical results on executive pay 
and performance companies made by Murphy (1985), Jensen argues that managers have 
incentives to keep resources and to increase the firms beyond its optimal size, hence the name 
“empire building” which represents the direct conflict with the interests of shareholders. In 
exchanging debt cons of capital across highly leveraged, credible managers pay their future 
free cash flow instead of retaining their own interest in project with a negative net present 
value (Jensen, 1986). At the same time, the risk of bankruptcy due to the recapitalization 
transaction with the Public to Private is increased for managers if they are not doing the same 
interest as principal. However, linking debt and motivation of managers, this can lead to 
results in significant agency costs (Calcagno, Renneboog, 2007).  
 
Free Cash Flow is used to study this hypothesis: the level of Free Cash Flow is approximated 
by operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend 
payments (Lehn et Poulsen, 1989).  
 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
 
Firms whose Free Cash Flow are important, are more likely to go private.  
 
 
 
E. Growth Prospects 
 
Another analysis was conduced on growth prospects for Public to Private transactions. 
According to Jensen (1986) companies that have low growth prospects appear as potential 
candidates to withdraw from the stock quote because they imply a weak management and 
decision making suboptimal. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) also confirm that the companies 
withdrew from the quotation have low prospects growth. A variable measuring growth 
prospects has been found with the ratio of Tobin’Q which measures the relationship between 
the market value of the firm and replacement cost of assets. A low ratio indicates low growth 
prospects and significant agency costs whereas a large value indicates substantial growth 
prospects and lower agency costs.  
 
Q ratio is the variable used: it is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets.  
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Hypothesis 5:  
 
Firms which have low growth prospects are more likely to go private.  
 
 
 
F. Takeover defence 
 
Another reason which may lead to the launch of a Public to Private transaction is the fear of 
being redeemed. Lowenstein (1985) notes that for many companies that withdraw (MBO…), 
it is a strategic defence against a final hostile offer to shareholders or cons of bidding. For fear 
of losing their jobs, managers prefer to leave the exchange. Moreover, when managers have a 
very important part in corporate capital, there is little likely to be bought by others (Jensen, 
Ruback, 1983). However, maintain control of society can lead managers to find themselves in 
a difficult situation because they have invested their entire personal wealth in society (Halpern 
and al., 1999; Hubbard and Palia, 1995). Numerous studies have analyzed this case. We can 
cite some examples:  
 
 In UK, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) found that 40.14% of companies redeemed in 
the form of traditional buyouts, have replaced their CEO in the first year following the 
takeover and 25.7% did so during the second year.  
 In the USA, Martin and McConnel (1991) found that 41.9% of teams leaders leave 
their jobs in the first year of transaction. Therefore, an MBO protects the leaders of 
this phenomenon. Management taking a large shareholder of the company to hedge 
against any possible hostile takeover. This hypothesis of protection against a hostile 
takeover suggests that premiums reflect the fact that the management team may have 
the intention to repurchase shares from other shareholders to protect itself against an 
unsolicited takeover bid.  
We use a dummy variable (Prior Takeover Defence) which is equal to 1 when the firm faces 
takeover one year before going private. 
 
 
Hypothesis 6:  
 
Firms which have takeover pressure, are more likely to go private .  
 
G. Undervaluation 
 
As a firm represents a “portofolio” (Kieschninck, 1989), there are informational asymmetries 
between managers and outside investors regarding the maximizing of the value of corporate 
assets (Roll, 1977; Lehn, Netter, Poulsen, 1990). However, it is impossible for managers who 
have private information to realize that share price of the company is undervalued compared 
to the real potential of the latter. This problem may be exacerbated when the listed companies, 
mostly small, have difficulties in the finance market to grow, which is difficult to attract the 
interest of investors. This lack of interest for these companies creates a lack of liquidity and 
involves a reduction in the value of the company which leads to exit the stock exchange 
(Peristinami, Mehran, 2006). 
Lowenstein (1985) explains that when managers represent the main part in control of the 
company, they can use specific methods in terms of technical and financial accounting to 
depreciate the stock price before the announcement (Schadler, Karns, 1990). By manipulating 
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the dividends, they refuse to meet analysts control because managers use the asymmetry 
information to their advantage.  
 
DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence in terms of manipulations that could be performed by 
managers. However, Harlow and Howe (1993), Kaestner and Liu (1996) confirm that in the 
case of MBO, there are important stock purchases made before going private. They confirm 
that the purchase is preceded by an informational asymmetry on the part of managers. The 
hypothesis of undervaluation suggests that the wealth obtained by the shareholders is from the 
undervaluation of corporate assets. 
Moreover, for investors, the increasing of liquidity in integrated shares of the company is a 
key factor for listed companies (Amihud, Mendelson, 1988). Conversely, the listed company 
with small market shares will have low liquidity and financial problems and they will have to 
remain listed. They will consider as main targets out of the document if they have no other 
means of funding. Therefore, firms in quotation which have low financial perspective and low 
liquidity will have a high probability to leave the coast and to become private. This explained 
by the fact that these companies generally have problems of severe informational asymmetry 
and would not benefit to remain in fellowship (Mehran, Peristianis, 2006).  
 
We use two variables: first PER (Price Earnings Ratio) to estimate the undervaluation and 
liquidity (assets minus stock divided to financial debt).  
 
Hypothesis 7:  
 
Firms which are undervalued, are more likely to go private 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
9. Methodology 
 
 
After presenting the seven hypotheses that we test, we study the methodology that we apply. 
As we introduced earlier in the article, two methods have been used to analyze the 
motivations of transactions which go private, that is to say the Public to Private. We will 
conduct a univariate analysis in first and in a second time we used a multivariate analysis 
(binary logistic analysis).  
We have to note that for a univariate study and then multivariate analysis, we must develop a 
control sample which will consist of companies that are in quotation. We can then consider 
what is the typical profile of a Public to Private transaction (in relation to a listed company).  
 
This method is to conduct a pairing technique, that is to say, the couple studied company: we 
have to look for Public to Private transaction with a listed company which have the same size 
(measured either by turnover or by total assets), located in the same industry and is listed at 
least a year. The choice of this technique is justified by the fact that it allows to assess the 
probability of occurrence of an event (the fact that a company withdraws from the exchange 
quotation in our case) and differentiate firms in Public Private companies to remain listed.  
 
As companies control sample obtained by the technique of pairing have the same size and are 
in the same industry, this method of analysis allows us to know why companies are in the 
private sector. 
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a. Sampling: going private sample 
 
The Public to Private transaction, as their name suggest, represent all companies emerging 
from the stock exchange. For this, we have chosen the database Thomson One Banker, which 
lists all going private. Three geographical areas were selected: the USA, Europe (Germany, 
Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden) and Asia (North, Central and 
South). All these areas cover 82% of the world PtoP population from 2000 to 2007. Thus, the 
sample covers virtually all PtoP. The choice of an international sample is justified by several 
reasons:  
 
 The previous studies have focused on geographical areas particular national character 
such as the USA or UK (Lehn, Poulsen (1989); Weir, Laing, Wright (2005)…).   
 Asia is a geographical area booming for PtoP transactions. It is the first time that Asia 
has been studied.  
 
Note that seven European countries were selected which are the main players in these 
operations. Concerning the empirical study, we will voluntarily split between European 
countries. Indeed, we separate UK and other countries. This choice is explained by the fact 
that UK was the pioneer country in Europe to develop these operations. It concentrates a large 
proportion of PtoP. Thus, the voluntary withdrawal of UK to the European sample avoids bias 
(an over-representation). We will see the results. So we treat UK as a geographical area by 
itself. The time horizon used is new, it covers the period from January 2000 to January 2007. 
Most studies have been conducted in the 90’s. To develop our sample, we used several data 
sources: Thomson One Banker, Factiva, Osiris and Datastream. Like any database existing 
provides all the information necessary for our analysis, we have used different sources of 
information in order to identify all PtoP from 2000 to 2007: it is to check the observations 
results.  
As we have stated, Thomson One Banker has allowed us to identify all going private over the 
selected period and selected geographical areas. About 1000 companies had been found. 
However, all going private are not PtoP transactions, so we treated each company to identify 
on the one hand if it is no active on the stock exchange and on the other hand, if it did not 
changed name. For this, we used the Factiva database, various newspapers and websites of 
companies. The second count of available sources gave us a number of 550 companies. 
However, taking into account our research objectives, we can conclude that operations 
satisfying the following conditions:  
 
 The PtoP transactions must be identified by a company with a company of the same 
nationality. This is important in terms of comparison monetary gains.  
 Transactions must be made, effective in the sense that they must be success. This 
condition allows us to measure the actual earnings of shareholders and to assess the 
performance of these companies. The share price of the title companies must be 
available on the Datastream database.  
 
As Thomson One Banker does not enough financial and government data, we used the 
OSIRIS database which collects all data from the annual reports of unlisted companies. It is 
one of the databases from Bureau Van Dijk. This database allows finding many financial and 
governance indicators. The 550 companies were searched again in the database. For some, we 
had either missing information or none usable information. In the end, 413 companies were 
selected. In order to ensure that all companies selected are PtoP transactions, a second 
analysis using Factiva has been achieved. The 413 companies selected previously were. A 
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final step is to gather all the share prices of these companies. This is necessary, when we 
calculate the cumulative abnormal average returns of 413 companies. For this, we obtained 
the data of release announcement listing of companies on the database Thomson One Banker. 
The diversity of information sources has forced us to be very vigilant about the verifying the 
accuracy of data obtained on our study. To summarize, four steps were necessary to achieve 
the sample:  
 
Step 1: collecting data on Thomson One Banker of going private from 2000 to 2007 for the 
United States, Europe and Asia. About 1000 firms were selected 
Step 2: checkout each company on the Factiva database, on newspapers and the sites of 
companies. 550 companies were selected. 
Step 3: search for financial and governmental information from Osiris. 413 companies were 
selected.  
Step 4: check on Factiva database for the last sample taken. These 413 companies will be part 
of our sample. 
 
[Insert Graph 1 about here] 
 
 
b. Control Sample 
 
 
The development of the control sample is performed based on two essential characteristics,  
namely the industry and total assets:  
 
 The industry: This includes the sectors key to the company. This allows us to 
consider, first, the life cycle of the industrial firm and secondly, between the particular 
industries in terms of financial structures. The database Thomson One Banker 
provides the SIC industry code, the pairing was done using it. In most cases, the firm 
control sample, that is to say the firm control, has been selected by referring to the first 
two digits of SIC code. In the rare case where no firm reference can not be observed 
using the first SIC code, the second and third times were used.  
 
 Total assets: it is a criteria representative of the size factor. We assume that the total 
assets is a good indicator of company size in the sense that it understands all investors 
industrial, commercial and financial. Moreover, the choice of this criterion allows us 
to avoid the biais introduced by the difference in size between firms in the same sector 
of activity and reflect the fact that SMEs do not have the same behavior as large 
corporations. Therefore, the firms listed have been selected, that is to say firms 
witnesses should have the nearest total assets to that of the studied company.  
 
To constitute this control sample, a rigorous methodology must be respected. We are based on 
a methodology which has already been applied by several authors, such as Weir et al. 2005; 
North, 2001; Klein and Zur, 2009; Achleitner, Betzer, Hinterramskogler, 2008.  
 
To summarize, the different steps of our methodology are:  
 
1. We select all listed companies whose headquarters are located in the same geographical 
area than we have in our sample, namely Europe, United Kingdom, the United States and 
Asia.  
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2. Our selection is refined with industry. For this, we take all companies that have the same 
“two-digit SIC”. For some companies, we expanded our criteria using the one-digit SIC.  
 
3. Then to identify pairs of companies of our control sample, we use a criterion of "size". We 
take the total assets of all remaining companies a year before the announcement of a going 
private. The company with the smallest standard deviation in absolute value of a Public to 
Pivate is selected as the corresponding company.  
 
4. A final test is realized to verify if all the firms selected in our control sample remained at  
least two years listed after the announcement of a going private.  
  
Our sample is composed of 413 companies: 86 in Europe, 108 in United Kingdom, 171 in 
the United States and 48 in Asia.  
 
 
c. Univariate Analysis 
 
Our univariate statistical analysis was conducted using two samples:  
 
 Sample 1: it includes all Public to Private of 2000 to 2007 for Europe, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Asia. The number of companies amounted to 413. 
 
 Sample 2 “the control sample”: it consists of companies that remained listed from 
2000 to 2007 for the four geographical areas. A methodology has been followed to 
fully optimize the development of this sample (company size, industry ...). The 
number of companies is identical to the sample 1.  
 
The procedure for obtaining the variables for the control sample was the same as that used for 
the main sample of our study, ie sample 1. A little nuance is to emphasize: we used the 
OSIRIS database for all financial data of unlisted companies. For the control sample, we used 
ORBIS which includes all financial data from annual reports of listed companies.  
So all these variables were identified for both samples. We then compare the average values 
from the latter to examine to what extent the differences observed empirically validate our 
hypotheses. To achieve this, we use on the one hand, a parametric test of mean difference and 
on the other hand a nonparametric test.  
 
d. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Using a binary logistic regression is justified because:  
 
 The dependent variable is qualitative, while the independent variables can be either 
qualitative or quantitative.  
 The dependent variable takes only two possible values that is to say 0 or 1. When the 
number of levels of the dependent variable is greater than two, the linear regression 
becomes multinomial. For our study, we limit ourselves to two levels.  
 
The choice of binary logistic regression can be explained by different reasons which are the 
following:  
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 When we are in the case where the dependent variable is qualitative, linear regression 
is not compatible because the conditions of constant variance and normality of 
residuals were not satisfied.  
 The logistic regression aims to determine the probability of occurrence of an event. 
This feature is very useful in determining the motivations of Public to Private 
transactions in relation to listed companies. 
 
As we stated previously, the dependent variable takes the value 0 or 1. In our study, to test our 
hypotheses, we compare firms that are delisted (the Public to Private: the PtoP) with firms 
that remained in stock (control sample) with the dependent variable Yi which is defined as 
follows:  
 
Yi = 1 if the firm belongs to the group of companies that are delisted.  
Yi = 0 if the firm belongs to the group of companies that remained public offering. 
 
The probability that a company go private can be written as follows:  
 
 
   
 
Where Zi = β1 + β2Xi  
 
This equation is an expression of the logistic distribution function.  
 
If Pi is the probability that a company goes private is given by the equation above, then  
(1 - Pi), the probability that it goes not private is:  
   
 
 
 
We can therefore write  
 
 
 
  
 
Thus, if we take the natural logarithm of this equation, we obtain the following result:  
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It means that L, the log likelihood ratio is clearly not linear in X but also linear in parameters. 
L is called the logit, hence the name for the type models, logit models.  
 
 
10. Descriptive Data of Public to Private Sample 
 
A.  Industry Composition 
 
The sample is large enough, however, we conduct a study on its industrial composition. For 
this, Table 2 explains the distribution companies which went private from 2000 and 2007 by 
sector of activity (from the definition of INSEE1) and according to geographical areas studied. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
The sectoral distribution of Public to Private shows that the majority of comments are in the 
industrial sector. In fact, approximately 65% of the sample in Europe are industrial firms, this 
result is 60% for the United States, 63% for United Kingdom and 70% for Asia. However, 
the business sector also represents an important weight.  
 
From a general standpoint, the four geographical areas in our sample include 60% of 
industrial companies.  
 
Note also that the Public to Private European sample are mainly represented by Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs). We can justify this aspect by the fact that European customs 
prefer small structures including Small and Medium Enterprises that hold between 1 and 499 
employees. Indeed, some laws are in place for the creation of small companies. For example, 
France makes the creation of micro-enterprise. The link of these companies in Europe is a 
strong weight in the dynamic industry. The following figures speak for themselves: over  
2 651 500 firms in France at December 31, 2006 and only 2,000 are considered large firms 
(the number of employees exceeds 500).  
 
Unlike the six European countries studied, the United Kingdom is aloof. We see through the 
statistics of the sample. Indeed, unlike other European countries, the United Kingdom has 
never bet on SMEs. The family tradition does not play an anchoring role, the business capital 
is dispersed. The SMEs in United Kingdom are nine times less important than SMEs in Italy 
and five times less than in France. This under-representation is due to the desindustrialization  
of the country since the 70s.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 French Institute of Statistics 
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We represent using the following graphs, the shares of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) within each geographic area:  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
B. Ownership 
 
We decomposed ownership in twelve categories:  
 
 Banks companies 
 Financial companies 
 Insurance companies 
 Industrial companies 
 Pension funds 
 Foundation and Research Institute 
 Public governmental authorities 
 Family  
 Employee/Managers/Directors 
 Private Equity 
 Other types of shareholders 
 Other types of private shareholders 
 
 
The following tables show the distribution of different categories of ownership: 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In general, we find that private equity funds occupy an important place in Asia (Graph 2) as 
the United States. Indeed, private equity funds in the United States and especially in Asia 
represent a very important part in the composition of the shareholding of the sample. In Asia, 
this share rises to 28.13%. According to the Asia Private Equity Review, the evolution of 
private equity in recent years is considerable. 
 
[Insert Graph 2 about here] 
 
In the United States, the private equity funds represent 24.56% of shareholders. This share is 
also very important. Unlike the results for Asia, it is not surprising that Private Equity in the 
United States has developed over many years.  
Regarding the family shareholders, it represents a significant share in Europe: it is the only 
area where it is truly present.  
 
The following graph can summarize all the shares comprising the share of family firms by 
geographical area:  
 
[Insert Graph 3 about here] 
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C.  Statistics of the sample 
 
We represent in Table 5 the descriptive statistics on the companies in our sample: accounting, 
performance and cash flow.  
For this, we defined four categories: company size, performance, leverage, taxes and cash 
flows. For each of them, some variables have been selected to illustrate them. This selection 
yielded the following results:  
 
 Size of the firm:  
o Total sales ($ millions) 
o Total assets ($ millions) 
 
 Performance: 
o Return on assets (ROA) 
 
 Leverage and Taxation:  
o Taxes (percentage of sales amount) 
o Gearing (ratio between debt and equity) 
 
 Cash Flow: 
o Free Cash Flow 
 
The following statistics are presented as follows: the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum. This analysis was conducted for each geographic area.  
 
Note that the total assets on average in the United States amounted to 793 million dollars, 
which is the highest result of our sample. It is also the United States where big firms are more 
represented. Asia has, in turn, the lowest total assets (average) of our sample.  
The performance measured by ROA which is the largest in the United States (ROA = 3.8%). 
That of Europe and the United Kingdom are close enough (Europe: 3.8% UK: 3.5%). Asia 
has great performance potential.  
Leverage effects are the largest observed in the United States and Asia. This effect is 
measured by the variable "Leverage," which is 1.6 in the United States and 1.5 for Asia. For 
the debt, Asia would have a relatively similar behavior to that of the United States.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
  D.  Summary 
 
Following this analysis about the sample, several observations can be given: 
 
 
 Europe differs markedly from the United Kingdom in terms of industrial structure and 
ownership composition: presence of a significant shareholding consisting of family 
companies in Europe.  
 
 For Asia, several points are worth noting:  
o Growth of sizeable of Public to Private 
o Important Growth of Private Equity 
o Part of the almost non-existent family shareholders 
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o The large companies are quite numerous 
o Highly leveraged 
 
All these characteristics tend to deduct a main conclusion: Asia would behave relatively 
similar to that of the United States in terms of industrial structure, even features (larger 
presence of private equity funds, low representation of family shareholding in capital 
companies ...). We assume that the empirical results will go in the same direction. 
 
 
11. Empirical Results  
 
a. Univariate results 
 
We present in the following table the results of our univariate analysis. We split the variables 
that operationalize all of our seven hypotheses developed in the previous section, in two parts  
and more precisely into two panels. These two panels are:  
 
 Panel A: It is dedicated to the ownership and control. It includes three types of 
variables: 
o Managerial Share 
o Blockholder Control (Institutional, Business, Family). 
o Takeover Defence 
 
 
 Panel B: it includes all the variables measuring the performance. They are nine in 
number:  
o Taxation 
o Gearing 
o Free Cash Flow 
o Q ratio 
o Q1/Q2 
o Q1/Q3 
o LQ*HFCF 
o PER 
o Liquidity 
 
Two statistical tests were used: t-test and z-test.  
 
We conducted a test of chi-square for dichotomous variables found in Panel A linked to the 
ownership and control. Regarding other variables grouped in Panel B linked to performance, a 
Wilcoxon test is used. 
 
 
i. Europe 
 
On the Panel A, we note that the ownership structure and corporate control in Public to 
Private in Europe is largely composed of managers and the Family blockholder (Andres, 
2008; Faccio and Lang, 2002). This confirms our statistical analysis, where the share of Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is very important. Europe's industrial sector is composed 
almost 90% of SMEs.  
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On panel B, we observe that the undervaluation, the growth prospects and the level of 
liquidity are three elements that characterize highly Public to Private transactions. Indeed, the 
data show that the growth prospects of the company measured by the Q ratio are much lower 
for the Public to Private than for companies belonging to the control sample (0.83 against 
1.45). The undervaluation is another criterion that qualifies Public to Private. The results are 
suggestive, 15 for the Public to Private cons 27 for SC2. Similarly, the lack of liquidity is also 
part of the criteria that characterize the Public to Private of other companies. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
ii. United Kingdom 
 
On the Panel A, the Institutional blockholder is a key characteristic of Public to Private 
transactions in UK (Weir et al., 2005). This is confirmed by the result (0.69) which is higher 
compared to that observed for other blockholders of the sample from Public to Private. We 
also note that Institutional blockholder plays an important role for the Public to Private and 
companies remained in stock exchange. However, we note that this result is lower than that it 
is observed in Europe. Moreover, the Family blockholder has no a real important role. 
However, no significance was found. The takeover pressure is in turn significantly higher for 
Public to Private, they are more subject to hostile or friendly offers, low growth prospects and 
liquidity in relation to listed companies (0.85 against 1.47 for growth prospects and 1.48  
against 2.02 for liquidity) make them ideal takeover targets.  
 
On panel B, the level of Free Cash Flow, growth prospects and lack of liquidity are also three 
major elements that characterize the Public to Private. The results are broadly similar to those  
found in the rest of Europe. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 
iii. United States 
 
On the Panel A, Corportation and Institutional blockholders are two major elements which 
characterize Public to Private transaction. We note that the Institutional blockholder is the key 
control block. It is both the highest of the panel but also the highest compared to other 
geographical areas. This can be understood by the fact that the Institutional blockholder 
includes other companies of Private Equity, which are the United States largely developed 
and invest heavily in these companies. The Family blockholder does not seem to explain PtoP 
in the United States like in United Kingdom. The takeover is also a feature of Public to 
Private in the United States. The result is the highest of the four areas. In the case of the 
United States, we can not invoke the lack of growth that companies fail to achieve its 
development because it is a country that despite the crisis, is a motor for growth. 
Nevertheless, we can justify it by the fact that the United States created many companies are 
made, but many also have financial difficulties and they often buy from other companies.  
On panel B, we also note that the level of Free Cash Flow, growth prospects, the 
undervaluation and the level of liquidity are all the four important factors. Note that the 
results are higher than those we observed in both Europe and the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
                                                 
2 SC : Sample Control 
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leverage is lower for companies in Public to Private than those which are in Stock Exchange. 
This applies also for Europe and  United Kingdom.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
iv. Asia 
 
On the Panel A, the Corporation and Institutional blockholders are both important elements 
relating to the ownership and control of companies in Public to Private. We find that for Asia, 
as in the United States, Institutional blockholder is the block which is the most representative. 
This observation is also justified by the fact of the growing rise of corporate investment in 
Private Equity. The Family blockholder is not significant. The takeover pressure in Asia is not 
a decisive factor for companies in Public to Private. This is justified by the fact that the 
development of Public to Private is still very recent, which limits the supply of heavy 
redemptions as companies suffer in other areas.  
 
Regarding Panel B, the same conclusion as the previous applies also for Asia. We also note 
that the level of taxation in Asia for the Public to Private transactions is much higher than 
other areas. Corporations in Private Public have an important level of taxation than companies 
of the control sample. In contrast, companies in Public to Private have low levels of leverage 
over the companies listed. We also note that this difference is most important to our entire 
sample. Tests for these two variables, taxation and gearing, appear very significant in Asia, 
contrary  
to what we observed in other areas.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
b. Multivariate results 
 
In the previous paragraph, we used univariate analysis to test the mean differences between 
the companies to Private and Public Companies in our control sample with the different 
variables that we presented. However, the univariate analysis does not take into account the 
impact of each factor, it does not allow us to consider the interplay of all factors. That is why 
now, we perform a binary logistic regression to study in detail the motivations: what are the 
investors’s motivations of Public to Private transaction.   
 
Note: the variable names have been shortened due to legibility of tables. Hence the 
significativity of variables: 
 
T:  Taxation 
G:  Gearing 
M:  Share of Managers 
I: Institutional Blockholder 
C:  Corporation Blockholder 
F:  Family Blockholder 
FCF:  Free Cash Flow 
Q:  Q ratio 
PTI:  Prior Takeover Interest 
L:  Liquidity 
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 Four models were made in order to avoid problems of correlation between variables. They 
made for each geographical area.  
 
We note that the results we obtain for the binary logistic regression are consistent with those 
obtained from our univariate analysis. For this, we proceed to some observations.  
 
Model 1 takes into account all variables except the three following: Q1/Q2, Q1/Q3,  
SQ * HFCF. The results are for all highly significant for the four geographical areas studied. 
We can draw the profile of a Public to Private transactions and the specifics of each.  
Generally, a low concentration of control, a high level of Free Cash Flow, growth prospects 
and a weak undervaluation are the main characteristics of Public to Private transactions face 
those which remained stock exchange. These characteristics apply to the entire sample. Now 
we specify the characteristics of each.  
 
Some differences must be noted between geographic areas and in particular with the Asian 
continent that is characterized by specific and very significant in our model.  
 
Furthermore, we verified the existence of collinearity between independent variables. This 
statistic is given when performing the linear regression in SPSS. The problem of 
multicollinearity is present when the index exceeds 15. When it exceeds the threshold of 30,  
multicollinearity in the sample is very important.  
 
None of our regressions is affected by the presence of multicollinearity between explanatory 
indicators. The highest statistic equals 11.53 which is below a threshold of 15. The final 
number of independent variables is 15. 
 
 
i. Europe 
 
Some remarks are necessary before explain the results. 
 
The overall results corroborate those of the univariate analysis. With binary logistic 
regression, we have the possibility of interaction between variables, we did not in the previous 
analysis. We note that all our variables give satisfactory results in terms of significance. This 
reinforces us in building our model. We observe that variables operationalizing the tax 
savings are not significant and the variable on the takeover pressure. This non-significance 
applies to all four models. We find that the power control is very significant for all models 
with high significance for Family Blockholder (Andres, 2008; Faccio and Lang, 2002). This 
finding is not checked for other geographical areas, what we observe in the following tables 
(20 to 22). Indeed, Europe has an ownership structure different from the United States (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). Moreover, ownership in the United States and  United Kingdom is largely 
diluted unlike in Europe where there is such a dominant Family blockholder. The only 
differences between the models tested we may note, are those on the "Performance". Indeed, 
we find that the variable characterizing the growth prospects are more significant when the 
model uses the Q ratio that is to say model 1. Model 1 uses the Q ratio is significant at the 
level of 1% against 5% for the ratios Q1/Q2, Q1/Q3 and SQ * HFCF. Similarly, the level of 
liquidity is more significant in model 1 than model 3. Model 1 seems to be slightly more 
efficient than the others. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
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ii. United Kingdom 
 
The results of binary logistic regression for the United Kingdom also corroborate those of the 
univariate analysis. All our variables are significant, even if the Corporation blockholder has a 
threshold of significance lower than found in Europe (5% against 1%). We also confirm our 
analysis in the sense that the Family blockholder is not significant for United Kingdom. This 
can be justified by the fact that the industrial fabric of small and medium enterprises is  
very low in contrast to Europe. 
 
The Q ratio of our model 1 is not as significant as in Model 1 relative to Europe. However, 
this model is further distinguished from the other three models in the sense that the 
significance obtained by the variables of undervaluation and liquidity is better than the others. 
We also note that model 1 shows better statistical characteristics than the other three (LR 
Chi²). 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
iii. USA 
 
The observed data from the sample of the United States are also in line with the results of the 
univariate analysis. The results of the U.S.A. sample suggest several remarks. Firstly, all 
models give very significant results. We can note that Free Cash Flow variable and the Q ratio 
variable are both significant at 1% level. We also note that different versions of this measure: 
Q1/Q2, Q1/Q3, SQ * HFCF are also very significant, greater than those observed in the two 
previous samples (Europe and United Kingdom). Furthermore, we observed that the leverage 
was lower for companies in Public to Private than those in the control sample. This finding 
was verified for other geographical areas. However, this difference was not significant neither 
for Europe nor for the United Kingdom, this observation is the same for the United States. We 
can conclude that the four models characterizing the U.S.A. sample are all very significant. 
However, the statistical model 1 is better. 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
iv. Asia 
 
The above results for the sample of Asia are very significant for the four models. The level of 
Free Cash Flow like those of Q ratios in the different variants turn out like for the U.S.A very 
significant, amounting to 1%. Europe and United Kingdom also had good results but at a level 
equal to 5%. The Control Block is characterized, as we observed in the univariate tests, by the 
Corporate and Institutional blockholders, Family blockholder is not significant. Lack of 
liquidity is a feature of Asian societies in Public to Private with the outcome very significant, 
amounting to 1%. Also a characteristic of the sample of Asia is the significance of variables 
operationalizing the hypothesis of the tax savings. Unlike the other three geographic areas in 
our sample, they are both significant. Our four models are very significant. However, model 1  
shows as in the others, better statistics. 
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
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12. Conclusion 
 
The seven motivations of Public to Private transactions that we identified, have been tested 
with both univariate analysis and logistic regression with a binary. This allowed us to identify 
the determinants of these transactions. Thus the results obtained give rise to the following 
conclusions:  
 
With univariate analysis, we obtain the following results:  
 
=> Panel A, on the ownership and control, has a strong influence on the motivations of Public 
to Private Transactions :  
 
o We note that managers are less present in societies emerging from the stock 
exchange. The variable that operationalizes this hypothesis, entitled "Managerial 
Share" is significant for all geographical areas studied. This common point is to 
emphasize whatever the nationality or origin of these companies.  
o Regarding the control blockholders, three categories were distinguished. In general, 
the control blockholders are less present in Public to Private transactions than those 
which are remained listed. We note that the presence of the Family blockholder is very 
poorly represented in different geographical areas except in Europe where the results 
are superior compared to others. Indeed, we note a result of 0.64 on average for the 
Family blockholder in Europe against 0.51 in the United Kingdom, against 0.49 in the  
United States against 0.53 in Asia. 
 
o The variable on the anti takeover defense of our hypothesis 6 is positive for the 
entire sample. This means that PtoP are more subject to hostile takeover. However,  
this variable is not significant and for any of the four areas.  
 
 Panel B includes all the variables measuring the performance of Public to Private.  
No variables related to the tax savings, which are the level of taxation and leverage, 
does not prove significant for our sample except for Asia, where the two variables 
show significant results up to 1%. Even if the results do not prove significant for other 
geographical areas, we note nevertheless that the level of taxation for PtoP is higher 
than the remaining companies on the stock market while the leverage is lower for 
PtoP. This confirms our expectations.  
 
o Regarding the level of Free Cash Flow and Growth prospects as measured by 
the Q ratio, our predictions are confirmed: the level of Free Cash Flow for PtoP 
transactions is higher than that of listed companies and the Q ratio is lower for 
PtoP. The interactive variable that we introduced (SQ * HFCF) is also 
significant. We note that the level of Free Cash Flow is more significant for the  
United States and Asia. 
 
o Finally, the undervaluation and the lack of liquidity are also significant for the 
sample, except underpricing for Asia firms which is certainly confirmed by the  
figures, but not confirmed by the significance. 
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On binary logistic regression, we obtain the following results :  
 
Note first that in order to perform optimally binary logistic regression in our study, four 
models were made for each geographical area. The choice of these four models are justified 
by the fact that the variables that we opted for the Free Cash Flow and the Q ratio showed a 
strong correlation (Free Cash Flow FCF and SQ *) then (Q ratio, Q1/Q2 and Q1/Q3).  
The results we obtained confirm exactly those presented earlier in our univariate analysis.  
The results we get from our study confirm those obtained in previous studies. Indeed, 
companies that have a higher probability of leaving the stock market have generally an 
important level of Free Cash Flow and low growth opportunities (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989, 
Opler and Titman, 1993), they face a problem of conflict between managers and shareholders 
(Halpern et al., 1999), they are undervalued (Halpern et al., 1999), they have a significant tax 
saving due to debt (Halpern et al. 1999; Kieschnick, 1998) and finally characterized by strong 
presence of Institutional blockholder within the control of the company (Weir et al., 2005). 
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Definitions of Variables 
 
Table 1: Variables  
 
Names Variables Definitions 
T Taxation Amount of Taxation (in percentage) 
G Gearing Leverage: ratio between financials debt to shareholder 
funds 
M Manager Shares Managerial Ownership (1: when the equity held by 
managers represents over 25% of shares of the company 
                                       0: otherwise) 
I Institutional 
Blockholder 
1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least 
equal to 5% of shares of the company 
                                        0 : otherwise) 
C Corporation 
Blockholder 
1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at least 
equal to 5% of shares of the company 
                                         0 : otherwise) 
F Family 
Blockholder 
1: when the share of family shareholders is at least equal 
to 5% of shares of the company 
                                         0 : otherwise) 
FCF Free Cash Flow It is approximated by operating income before 
depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and 
dividend payments (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). 
Q  Q ratio Q ratio: is defined as market capitalisation deflated by 
total assets 
Q1/Q2 Q1/Q2 Q1/Q2: the Q ratio in the year before going private (at the 
last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the 
previous year 
Q1/Q3 Q1/Q3 Q1/Q3: the Q ratio in the year before going private 
divided by the Q ratio two years before 
LQ*HFCF Low Q ratio* High 
Free Cash Flow 
LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if a firm had below median Q and above median free cash 
flow and zero otherwise 
Size Ln (Sales)  
PTI Prior Takeover 
Interest 
Prior Takeover Interest: a dummy variable which equals 1 
if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading 
up to the PTP announcement  
PER Price Earning Ratio Price Earning Ratio 
L Liquidity Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt 
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Details of Public to Private Sample from 2000 to 2007 
 
Table 2: Representation of industries in Public to Private sample 
 
 
  
Europe (without UK) 
 
 
United Kingdom (UK) 
 
USA 
 
Asia 
 
Primary Sector 
 
 
4% 
 
3% 
 
4% 
 
10% 
 
Industry Sector 
 
 
65% 
 
63% 
 
60% 
 
70% 
 
Business Sector 
 
 
31% 
 
34% 
 
36% 
 
20% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Shares representing Small and Medium Enterprises in Public to Private sample 
 
 
 
  
Europe (without 
UK) 
 
 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
 
USA 
 
Asia 
 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) 
 
 
80% 
 
65% 
 
60% 
 
70% 
 
Society over 500 employees 
 
 
20% 
 
35% 
 
40% 
 
30% 
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Graph 2: Private Equity in Asia 
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Graph 3: Shares of Family companies in the Public to Private sample 
 
Shares of Family companies for each geographical areas
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Composition of Shareholding 
 
Table 4: Composition of the sample share of Public to Private 
 
This table shows the composotion of shareholders, it refers the hypothesis 3 where we decided 
to establish a threshold to 5% by category of owner. We have elaborated the proportion of 
each category of shareholders. We identified 12 categories: Banks, Financial Company, 
Insurance Company, Industrial Companies, Mutual & Pension Fund, Fondation/Research 
Institute, Public Authorities/States Governements, One or more know individuals or families, 
Employees/Managers/Directors, Private Equity Firms, Other unamed shareholders, Unamed 
Private Shareholders.  
 
 
Categories Proportion of the sample (=413 firms) 
  ASIA EUROPE UK USA 
Banks  3,13% 21,68% 16,85% 4,98% 
Financial Company 0,00% 0,00% 3,33% 4,77% 
Insurance Company 0,00% 0,00% 2,54% 0,97% 
Industrial Companies 56,25% 56,92% 52,54% 53,62% 
Mutual & Pension Fund 6,25% 0,00% 5,10% 3,05% 
Fondation/Research Institute 0,00% 0,00% 0,85% 0,00% 
Public authorities/States Governments 3,13% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
One or more know individuals or families 3,11% 15,25% 10,85% 5,04% 
Employees/Managers/Directors 0,00% 1,53% 1,70% 1,45% 
Private Equity Firms  28,13% 4,62% 6,24% 24,56% 
Other unnamed shareholders 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,12% 
Unamed Private shareholders 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,44% 
       
  100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
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Descriptive Statistics of Public to Private 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Public to Private sample 
 
  Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
United Kingdom 
Total Sales ($ 
million) 
204 54,7 367 18 2103 Firm Size 
Total Assets ($ 
million) 
225 77 436 8 4754 
Performance Return On 
Assets  
3,5 5,4 18,4 -250 37 
Taxes (% of 
Sales) 
1,9 1,7 2,9 -3,5 16,7 Leverage and 
Taxes 
Gearing 1,2 1,1 1,50 -1,7 3,1 
Cash Flow Free Cash 
Flow 
4,4 
 
4,3 
 
15,1 
 
-74 
 
52,3 
 
       
Europe 
Total Sales ($ 
million) 
514 238 603 11,3 3252 Firm Size 
Total Assets ($ 
million) 
565 196 652 12 3912 
Performance Return On 
Assets  
3,8 5,9 20,2 -200 50 
Taxes (% of 
Sales) 
1,2 1,1 16,4 -160 25 Leverage and 
Taxes 
Gearing 1,4 1,3 1,5 -2,3 1,5 
Cash Flow Free Cash 
Flow 
4,5 
 
4,4 
 
18,9 
 
-2,4 
 
18,7 
 
       
USA 
Total Sales ($ 
million) 
793 407 832 150 4035 Firm Size 
Total Assets ($ 
million) 
975 410 933 105 5441 
Performance Return On 
Assets  
4,3 5,2 22,5 -210 70 
Taxes (% of 
Sales) 
1,5 1,4 8,8 1,9 8,86 Leverage and 
Taxes 
Gearing 1,6 1,6 2,3 -1,9 4,5 
Cash Flow Free Cash 
Flow 
5,3 
 
5,2 
 
19,3 
 
-6,04 
 
36 
 
       
Asia 
Firm Size Total Sales ($ 
million) 
180 165 213 152 1693 
 32 
Total Assets ($ 
million) 
265 56 278 19 1361 
Performance Return On 
Assets  
3,7 3,1 17,2 -52,3 23 
Taxes (% of 
Sales) 
1,9 1,8 3,5 -1,6 4,1 Leverage and 
Taxes 
Gearing 1,5 
 
1,7 
 
2,4 
 
-1,9 
 
2,7 
 
Cash Flow Free Cash 
Flow 
4,2 4,0 12,8 -99 36 
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Results: Univariate Analysis 
 
The following table compares our sample of 413 Public to Private Transactions (PtoP) 
companies with a sample control (SC) of time-, country-, industry- and size-matched 
companies remaining public. Panel A depicts ownership based variables. They are based on 
the firms’ blockholder structure on the OSIRIS and ORBIS (databases), before the going 
private announcement. Panel B shows accounting and stock based variables. We collect 
accounting data on the fiscal year (FY) date prior to the going private announcement. 
 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Table 6: Europe 
 
 PtoP  SC  t value z statistic 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
  
Panel A: Ownership and 
Control 
            
Manager Shares 0,65 1 0,85 1 -2,682*** -2,679*** 
Institutional Blockholder 0,61 1 0,75 1 -2,697*** -2,643*** 
Corporation Blockholder 0,58 1 0,72 1 -2,791*** -2,728*** 
Family Blockholder 0,64 1 0,84 1 -2,904*** -2,876*** 
Prior Takeover Interest 0,56 1 0,52 1 1,036 1,123 
       
Panel B: Performance 
            
Taxation 1,21 1,17 1,18 1,08 1,026 1,103 
Gearing 1,42 1,38 1,45 1,39 -1,115 -1,112 
Free Cash Flow 4,55 4,43 3,77 3,70 2,169** 2,214** 
Q ratio 0,83 0,81 1,45 1,42 -3,987*** -3,521*** 
Q1/Q2 0,91 0,87 1,05 1,03 -3,362*** -3,214*** 
Q1/Q3 0,86 0,85 1,12 1,09 -3,556*** -3,514*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,37 0,25 0,24 0,16 2,105** 2,034** 
PER 15,14 14,52 26,78 25,92 -2,412** -2,376** 
Liquidity 1,45 1,38 2,09 1,96 -2,654*** -2,698*** 
 
SC: Sample contol 
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Table 7: United Kingdom 
 
 PtoP   SC  t value z statistic 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
  
Panel A: Ownership and 
Control 
            
Manager Shares 0,51 1 0,68 1 -2,426** -2,387** 
Institutional Blockholder 0,69 1 0,81 1 -2,215** -2,134** 
Corporation Blockholder 0,56 1 0,65 1 -2,196** -2,102** 
Family Blockholder 0,51 0 0,53 1 -1,102 -1,006 
Prior Takeover Interest 0,57 0 0,55 1 1,126 1,101 
       
Panel B: Performance 
            
Taxation 1,91 1,78 1,87 1,83 1,556 1,519 
Gearing 1,23 1,18 1,26 1,20 -1,272 -1,217 
Free Cash Flow 4,46 4,35 4,12 4,03 2,456** 2,418** 
Q ratio 0,85 0,79 1,47 1,38 -4,056*** -3,875*** 
Q1/Q2 0,97 0,92 1,12 1,08 -3,915*** -3,723*** 
Q1/Q3 0,83 0,77 1,22 1,17 -3,992*** -3,834*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,35 0,33 0,27 0,25 2,056** 1,998** 
PER 14,16 13,76 20,42 19,54 -2,385** -2,426** 
Liquidity 1,48 1,35 2,02 1,97 -2,582*** -2,569*** 
 
 
Table 8: USA 
 
 PtoP   SC  t value z statistic 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
  
Panel A: Ownership and 
Control 
            
Manager Shares 0,54 1 0,62 1 -2,456** -2,417** 
Institutional Blockholder 0,72 1 0,92 1 -2,879*** -2,764*** 
Corporation Blockholder 0,64 1 0,89 1 -2,367** -2,298** 
Family Blockholder 0,49 1 0,52 0 -0,987 -0,873 
Prior Takeover Interest 0,65 1 0,61 1 1,005 0,996 
       
Panel B: Performance 
            
Taxation 1,50 1,45 1,48 1,32 1,251 1,197 
Gearing 1,63 1,60 1,65 1,75 -1,145 -1,126 
Free Cash Flow 5,26 5,21 4,83 4,53 2,746*** 2,684*** 
Q ratio 0,77 0,71 1,53 1,44 -4,456*** -4,067*** 
Q1/Q2 0,85 0,78 1,15 1,09 -3,818*** -3,534*** 
Q1/Q3 0,81 0,72 1,26 1,21 -4,257*** -4,127*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,46 0,41 0,33 0,27 2,224** 2,158** 
PER 13,24 12,76 28,65 27,54 -3,547*** -3,468*** 
Liquidity 1,45 1,26 2,01 1,89 -2,652*** -2,592*** 
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Table 9: Asia 
 
 PtoP   EDC  t value z statistic 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median 
  
Panel A: Ownership and 
Control 
            
Manager Shares 0,61 1 0,78 1 -2,662*** -2,687*** 
Institutional Blockholder 0,62 1 0,85 1 -3,005*** -2,954*** 
Corporation Blockholder 0,63 1 0,79 1 -2,458** -2,397** 
Family Blockholder 0,53 0 0,55 0 -0,789 -0,654 
Prior Takeover Interest 0,65 1 0,62 1 1,205 1,117 
       
Panel B: Performance 
            
Taxation 1,90 1,83 1,60 1,56 3,421*** 3,217*** 
Gearing 1,54 1,72 1,82 1,75 -2,896*** -2,746*** 
Free Cash Flow 4,23 4,02 3,97 3,83 4,569*** 4,327*** 
Q ratio 0,82 0,73 1,45 1,39 -4,787*** -4,654*** 
Q1/Q2 0,88 0,81 1,15 1,08 -3,956*** -3,872*** 
Q1/Q3 0,83 0,70 1,19 1,07 -4,362*** -4,317*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,42 0,40 0,28 0,25 2,178** 2,113** 
PER 16,45 15,92 26,36 25,73 -1,831* -1,729* 
Liquidity 1,49 1,35 2,05 1,88 -2,685*** -2,695*** 
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Results: Multivariate Results 
 
The tables present potential determinants of our going private transactions by means of binary 
logit regressions. The response variable is coded 1 for going private firms and 0 for control 
firms. 
***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Table 10: Europe 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
  
               
Taxation                
T  0.1957 1.5731 0.2132 1.6124 0.2065 1.5992 0.2167 1.5674 
G -0.5125 -1.0256  -0.5210  -1.0343  -0.5124  -1.0251  -0.5189  -1.0298  
                 
Incentive Realignment                
M -2.0512 -2.6526***  -2.0629  -2.6423***  -2.1532  -3.9857***  -1.9862  -3.5043***  
                 
Control                
I -1.7874 -3.3810***  -1.7683  -3.3553***  -1.7021  -3.3012***  -1.7752  -3.3793***  
C -1.9650 -2.6563***  -1.9556  -2.6410***  -1.9457  -3.5365***  -1.9525  -3.5398***  
F -2.3766 -4.0029***  -2.3697  -3.9897***  -2.3525  -3.9452***  -2.3847  -4.0206*** 
                 
Free Cash Flow                
FCF 0.0215 2.2104 ** 0.0193  2.2261**  0.0012  2.2564**      
         
Growth Prospects         
Q  -0.0123 -2.6875***              
Q1/Q2    -0.0231 -2.4567**          
Q1/Q3        -0.0414  -2.2113**      
LQ*HFCF            0.0342  1.9927**  
                 
Takeover Defense                
PTI 0.9121 1.0911 0.8993  1.2620 0.8784  1.1563 0.9172  1.2098 
                 
Under-valuation                
PER -0.0474 -2.4237**  -0.0523  -2.4518**  -0.0727 -2.5572**  -0.0813  -2.5315**  
L -0.0327 -2.6653***  -0.0383  -2.6517***  -0.0390  -2.5663**  -0.0378  -2.6446***  
         
Constant 1.5432 2.76*** 1.5276 2.42** 1.4876 2.39** 1.4904 2.35** 
Observations 86  86  86  86  
Pseudo R² 22.12  21.54  21.34  21.31  
LR Chi² 63.87***  57.43***  55.21***  55.14***  
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Table 11: United Kingdom 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
  
               
Taxation                
T  0.2352 1.2551  0.2213  1.2656   0.2263 1.2409  0.2152  1.2729  
G -0.4523 -1.0434  -0.4612  -1.0325   -0.4424 -1.0561  -0.4360  -1.0754  
                 
Incentive 
Realignment                
M -1.9956 -2.3675**  -1.9743  -2.3718**   -2.0212 -2.5223**  -2.0466  -2.5312**  
                 
Control                
I -2.1214 -2.5611**  -2.1621  -2.5827***   -2.1545 -2.5763***  -2.2122  -2.6052***  
C -2.0025 -2.4572**  -2.0014  -2.4632**   -2.0114 -2.4859**  -2.1035  -2.5354**  
F -0.9738 -1.1276  -0.9620  -1.1358  -0.9603 -1.1317  -0.9542  -1.1461 
                 
Free Cash 
Flow                
FCF 0.0427 2.2156**  0.0399  2.2214**   0.0454 2.1983**      
         
Growth 
Prospects         
Q  -0.0214 -2.3326**              
Q1/Q2    -0.0285  -2.2378**          
Q1/Q3         -0.0279 -2.2432**      
LQ*HFCF            0.0193  2.3368**  
                 
Takeover 
Defense                
PTI 1.0188 1.2012  1.0157  1.2234   1.0213 1.1987  0.9259  1.1023  
                 
Under-
valuation                
PER -0.0989 -2.5816***  -0.0951  -1.9958**   -0.0972 -1.9875**  -0.0914  -1.9616**  
L -0.0571 -2.6125***  -0.0583  -1.9753**   -0.0567 -2.1153**  -0.0593  -1.9807**  
         
Constant 1.3567 2.59*** 1.3276 2.45** 1.3095 2.43** 1.3172 2.41** 
Observations 108  108  108  108  
Pseudo R² 25.79  24.74  24.12  23.85  
LR Chi² 62.54***  60.03***  58.53***  55.87***  
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Table 12: USA 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
  
               
Taxation                
T  0.3357 1.1023  0.3462  1.1074  0.3214 1.0986  0.3127  1.0953  
G -0.0256 -1.6234  -0.0305  -1.5016  -0.0312  -1.5838  -0.3150  -1.5779  
                 
Incentive 
Realignment                
M -1.7452 -2.3487**  -1.7562  -2.3518**   -1.6351 -2.4327**  -1.0328  -2.3412**  
                 
Control                
I -1.8304 -2.9932***  -1.8524  -3.0247***  -1.8427  -3.0117***  -1.8621  -3.0397***  
C -1.7353 -2.4951**  -1.7470  -2.5123**  -1.7452 -2.5033**  -1.7322  -2.4819**  
F -0.7521 -1.1078  -0.7427  -1.1394  -0.7468  -1.1325  -0.7241  -1.1626  
                 
Free Cash 
Flow                
FCF 0.0073 3.5318***  0.0094  3.5127***   0.0225 3.1277***      
         
Growth 
Prospects         
Q  -0.0052 -3.2612***              
Q1/Q2    -0.0037  -3.3568***          
Q1/Q3         -0.0043 -3.3157***      
LQ*HFCF            0.0038  3.2968***  
                 
Takeover 
Defense                
PTI 0.5356 1.1003  0.5632  1.0257   0.5526 1.0531  0.7124  1.0067  
                 
Under-
valuation                
PER -0.0798 -2.5314**  -0.0813  -2.5231**   -0.0837 -2.5127**  -0.0791  -2.5373**  
L -0.0326 -2.8527***  -0.0318  -2.8578***   -0.0356 -2.8326***  -0.0401  -2.8052***  
         
Constant 1.89 2.72*** 1.82 2.53** 1.77 2.48** 1.71 2.45** 
Observations 171  171  171  171  
Pseudo R² 39.87  38.75  38.59  38.21  
LR Chi² 66.78***  64.35***  62.31***  60.15***  
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Table 13: Asia 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
  
               
Taxation                
T  0.0092 3.0156***  0.0112  2.9734***  0.0217 2.9327***   0.0134 2.9634***  
G -0.0321 -2.7784***  -0.0417  -2.6933***  -0.0393 -2.7352***  -0.0403 -2.6831***  
                 
Incentive 
Realignment                
M -0.0145 -2.4567**  -0.0208  -2.4219**  -0.0617  -2.4452**  -0.0236  -2.3921**  
                 
Control                
I -1.5307 -2.8923*** -1.5520  -2.9253***  -1.5446  -2.9105***  -1.5212  -2.8844***  
C -1.3236 -2.4335**  -1.3305  -2.4476**  -1.3492  -2.4610**  -1.3126  -2.7287***  
F -0.6372 -1.0058  -0.5917  -1.0052  -0.6213  -1.0055  -0.6209  -1.0048  
                 
Free Cash 
Flow                
FCF 0.0356 2.8521***  0.0423  2.8027***  0.0292  2.8394***      
         
Growth 
Prospects         
Q  -0.0214 -2.8873***              
Q1/Q2    -0.0224  -2.8645***          
Q1/Q3        -0.0327  -2.6928***      
LQ*HFCF            0.0226  2.8754***  
                 
Takeover 
Defense                
PTI 0.6923 1.1782  0.7536  1.1244  0.7247  1.1536  0.7212  1.1231  
                 
Under-
valuation                
PER -0.0856 -2.2563**  -0.0922  -2.1893**  -0.0961  -2.1739**  -0.0483  -2.0057**  
L -0.0652 -2.6917***  -0.0661  -2.6832***  -0.0656 -2.6882*** -0.0672  -2.6786***  
         
Constant 1.82 2.68*** 1.78 2.52** 1.72 2.48** 1.65 2.39** 
Observations 48  48  48  48  
Pseudo R² 37.65  36.56  36.12  35.83  
LR Chi² 59.64***  57.32***  58.63***  57.97***  
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Summary of Hypothesis and Expected Results 
 
Table 14: Summary of Hypothesis and Expected Results 
 
Hypothesis Operationalization Expected 
Results  
Results 
 
H1 : Tax Saving 
 
Taxation (% of sales) 
Gearing (Financial Debt/ 
Shareholder Funds) 
 
 
+ 
- 
Not significant 
except for Asia 
Not significant 
except for Asia 
 
H2 : Incentive 
Realignment   
 
Managers Share 
 
- 
 
 
 
Significant and 
NegatiVE 
 
H3 : Control 
 
Institutionnal Blockholder 
Corporation Blockholder 
Family Blockholder 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
Significant and 
Negative 
Significant and 
Negative 
Not significant 
except for Europe 
 
H4 : Free Cash 
Flow 
 
Free Cash Flow 
 
 
+ 
 
 
Significant and 
Positive 
H5 : Growth 
Prospects 
Q Ratio 
 
- Significant and 
Negative 
 
H6 : Anti-
Takeover 
 
Prior Takaover Defense (1= 
yes) 
 
+ 
 
 
Not Significant 
 
H7 : Under-
Valuation 
 
PER (Price Earning Ratio)  
Liquidity 
 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
Significant and 
Negative 
Significant and 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
